USS Gerald R. Ford Has a Message for the Navy: No More Deployment Extensions
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle warned in recent days that extending the historic deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) and its associated carrier strike group would impose unsustainable strain on both sailors and the strike group’s readiness.
Ford-class Aircraft Carrier. Image Credit: US Navy.
The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) underway under her own power for the first time while leaving Newport News Shipbuilding, Newport News, Virginia (USA), on 8 April 2017. The first-of-class ship – the first new U.S. aircraft carrier design in 40 years – spent several days conducting builder’s sea trials, a comprehensive test of many of the ship’s key systems and technologies. USS George Washington (CVN-73) and the amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge (LHD-3) are visible in the background.
Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier Artist Rendering. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
The assessment was outlined to reporters at the Surface Navy Association’s annual symposium in Arlington, Virginia.
The strike group, led by the U.S. Navy’s newest and most advanced supercarrier, has been at sea for more than 200 days since departing Naval Station Norfolk on a regularly scheduled deployment on June 24, 2025. Originally tasked with operations in European and Mediterranean waters, the group was moved in autumn to Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the Caribbean to support counternarcotics and security missions at the direction of the Trump administration.
Speaking to reporters, Caudle said he would resist any attempt to extend the Ford’s planned deployment period, citing the cumulative impact on the crew’s families and personal lives, as well as the strain it would place on scheduled maintenance and readiness.
What Caudle Told Reporters on Supercarrier USS Gerald R. Ford
While talking to reporters at the annual symposium, Caudle said that while the Gerald R. Ford strike group’s capabilities remain highly valued, he cannot support extending its deployment, which is currently being watched by the world, if such an order would be required for operations in the Middle East or elsewhere.
“I think the Ford, from its capability perspective, would be an invaluable option for any military thing the president wants to do,” Caudle said, per The War Zone. “But if it requires an extension, it’s going to get some push back from the CNO. And I will see if there is something else I can do.”
Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
USS Gerald R. Ford. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Caudle also outlined multiple ways in which prolonged cruises can impact U.S. readiness. First, there is the human dimension: extended time at sea beyond scheduled deployment periods disrupts sailors’ lives, complicating family events and personal planning.
Second, he noted, was the impact of prolonged deployment on the ships’ material readiness and maintenance schedule, disrupting critical yard work and increasing repair costs when ships eventually return for maintenance in a worse state than originally anticipated.
The strike group’s current mission – roughly seven months and counting – already places it at the upper end of what the Navy typically plans for carrier deployments. Extended cruises of this sort have historical precedent: USS Nimitz completed a 341-day deployment during the pandemic, marking the longest such U.S. carrier deployment in decades. But Caudle’s comments suggest that what was once an extraordinary exception should not become a norm.
Caudle declined to specify alternative options for meeting operational demands if the Ford were not available for extension, but did indicate that other naval assets could be tapped to provide options.
Global Demands and Navy Posture After the Venezuela Operation
The Gerald R. Ford’s extended 2025 deployment has not only put pressure on its crew and material readiness, but it has also reshaped U.S. naval posture in critical regions, with implications for strategic flexibility.
The decision to move the strike group from the Mediterranean to the Caribbean under SOUTHCOM to bolster counter-narcotics operations has left the U.S. Navy without a carrier strike group in the Middle East and Europe at a time of continued and rising tension with Iran. The move has reduced the number of carrier platforms available to respond immediately to Middle East contingencies, limiting immediate air attack capability and thereby affecting deterrence posture, too.
The absence of an aircraft carrier – and its air wing – in the Middle East is a major operational trade-off that was made as a result of finite assets being committed in overlapping theaters. Though other naval assets, such as destroyers, littoral combat ships, and shore-based air forces, can partially fill gaps, they cannot fully replicate the sustained, layered air power and command and control that a carrier strike group can provide.
While the U.S. is by no means ill-equipped, the situation surrounding the Gerald R. Ford strike groups reflects a broader structural problem facing the U.S. Navy: persistent global demand rubbing up against a carrier force with little to no flexibility.
According to U.S. Navy fleet-tracking data compiled by the United States Naval Institute, only a small number of America’s 11 aircraft carriers are deployable at any given time due to maintenance and training cycles, limiting surge capacity amid overlapping crises. Analysts have warned for years that repeated deployment extensions risk worsening existing maintenance backlogs and accelerating long-term readiness decline – a concern that has also been echoed in multiple Government Accountability Office assessments on the matter.
Caudle’s stated resistance to extending Gerald R. Ford’s deployment is by no means a fringe concern – it reflects growing concern about America’s overall readiness and reveals an uncomfortable truth: America’s shipbuilding industry is struggling with major infrastructure, workforce, and capacity challenges that limit deployment flexibility.
About the Author:
Jack Buckby is a British researcher and analyst specialising in defence and national security, based in New York. His work focuses on military capability, procurement, and strategic competition, producing and editing analysis for policy and defence audiences. He brings extensive editorial experience, with a career output spanning over 1,000 articles at 19FortyFive and National Security Journal, and has previously authored books and papers on extremism and deradicalisation.
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